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Class Conflict, Corporate Power, 
and Macroeconomic Policy: The Impact of 
Inflation in the Postwar Period 
Ann Mari May 
and 
Randy R. Grant 
When Richard Nixon ran for the presidency in 1968, he declared that 
inflation was America's number one problem. While opinion polls 
showed otherwise, an undaunted Nixon set about to reduce inflation 
and to convince the public of the dangers of rising prices. To help in 
this effort, the Council of Economic Advisors initiated a study to iden- 
tify those impacted adversely by inflation. The study, however, was dis- 
appointing. According to Herbert Stein, "If anyone was being severely 
hurt, the available statistics were too crude to reveal it."' 
Nixon was not the first, nor was he the last president to warn of the 
hazards of inflation. Virtually every postwar president since Dwight Ei- 
senhower has warned of the ravages of inflation and perpetuated the, 
by now, unquestioned belief that inflation exacts a tremendous toll on 
the standard of living of most, if not all Americans. This belief has in 
turn allowed policymakers to enact contractionary policies that often 
impose tremendous human costs on those least able to sustain them in 
an effort to reduce inflation. 
The authors are Assistant Professor and graduate student, respectively, in the Depart- 
mcnt ofEconornics, Lrni~-ersitv of Nebraska-Lincoln. This article was presented at the an- 
ntral rnectings cf the .4ssociation .for Evolutionary Economics, 28 December 1990, 
U'ashington. D. C. 
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While the costs of unemployment are highly visible and identifiable, 
impacting lower income groups much more significantly than upper in- 
come groups, the costs of moderate inflation are more ambiguous.* 
Like unemployment, the costs of inflation are not shared equally 
throughout society. However, unlike unemployment, moderate infla- 
tion appears to disadvantage the rich and benefit, or at least not hurt, 
a large proportion of the population. 
This article examines inflation in the postwar period and offers an 
explanation for the aversion to inflation that fits within a radical insti- 
tutionalist framework.3 We suggest that the concern over inflation re- 
flects the interests of corporate welfare over the interests of community 
welfare. Moreover, anti-inflation efforts have accommodated corporate 
consolidation and hegemony. 
Reexamining the Costs of Zqilation 
When the Full Employment Bill was initially proposed in 1945, pub- 
lic support for federal government intervention to maintain full em- 
ployment was substantial. The Great Depression made the need for 
government action on the federal level appear obvious, while the suc- 
cess of the war economy of World War I1 made planning appear pos- 
sible. However, opposition to the Full Employment Bill quickly 
mobilized. Not surprisingly, the National Association of Manufactur- 
ers and other business organizations argued that the bill would under- 
mine business confidence and lead to inflati~n.~ 
That government intervention to maintain full employment would 
undermine business confidence was not an unexpected argument. But 
the argument that government efforts to maintain full employment 
would lead to inflation is unique to the postwar period and resulted in 
the inclusion of price stability as a policy goal in the Employment Act 
of 1946. 
The inclusion of price stability as a policy goal in the Employment 
Act of 1946 laid the foundation for the postwar debate over macroeco- 
nomic policy. Implicit in the policy debate was the assumption that 
while unemployment impacts different groups differently, inflation 
hurts all or most Americans. Empirical studies analyzing the costs of 
inflation, however, do not confirm this assumption. 
In a study examining the distribution of money income by quintiles, 
Alan S. Blinder and Howard Esaki find that inflation has not signifi- 
cantly influenced the size distribution of family income. Their findings 
indicate that no income groups suffered a significant decline in money 
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income from inflation.' Moreover, Robinson Hollister and John 
Palmer, who examine expenditures, rkal income, and wealth effects 
from inflation on the poor and non-poor, find that the relative position 
of the poor may actually have improved with inflation from 1947 to 
1967.qn a similar analysis examining expenditures of the poor from 
1967 to 1981, Douglas A. Hibbs Jr. concludes that inflation "may ac- 
tually have improved somewhat the relative real income position of 
low-income  household^."^ 
Finally, Joseph Minarik simulates the effect of moderate inflation on 
a broader measure of household income called "accrued comprehen- 
sive income," which includes consumption plus the change in net 
worth. Minarik's results show no income loss for low-income house- 
holds, while middle-income households are unaffected for the most 
part. In contrast, upper-income households lose substantially from in-. 
flation. According to Minarik, "greater real income taxes, lagging cor- 
porate retained earnings, and especially the depreciation of the face 
value of dollar-denominated interest-bearing securities combine to 
make upper income households the big losers from inflati~n."~ 
The results of these empirical studies would seem to indicate that 
moderate inflation adversely impacts only upper-income households 
and may even result in a decrease in income inequality. But what about 
the corporate sector and corporate income? 
Douglas Hibbs examines both pre-tax and after-tax profit shares 
rates of return from 1950 to 1981. Hibbs finds that while "inflation 
bears essentially no connection to either the pretax profit share or the 
pretax rate of return in the private corporate sector," inflation does ad- 
versely impact after-tax profits and the after-tax rate of r e t ~ r n . ~  Depre- 
ciation allowances and inventory valuation methods explain this 
decline in after-tax corporate profits. According to Hibbs, corporate tax 
law, until 198 1, stipulated that depreciation allowances be based upon 
capital assets valued at historical cost. With inflation, the value of the 
depreciation allowance is eroded. Additionally, inventory valuation 
methods such as first in/first out (FIFO) overstate corporate profits and 
increase corporate taxes by evaluating costs at the oldest levels. 
Examination of the empirical evidence suggests that a majority of 
households do not suffer real income loss as a result of moderate infla- 
tion. Far from being a widespread problem affecting all or most Ameri- 
cans, inflation appears to adversely impact only upper-income 
households, in addition to eroding away after-tax profits. If moderate 
inflation has such a benign impact, how do we explain the persistent 
aversion to inflation? 
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One possible explanation, offered by Edward Foster, suggests that the 
public "misunderstands" inflation and attributes declines in real in- 
come from other sources, to the effects of inflation.I0 A second expla- 
nation offered by Foster is that inflation erodes confidence in 
government and its ability to solve problems in a just and equitable 
manner." This argument is, of course, a variant of the one proposed 
by John Maynard Keynes and more recently by James K. Galbraith.lz 
These arguments, while plausible, do not offer a very satisfiing expla- 
nation. Keynes and Galbraith's observations would seem to apply 
more to European countries with historical experience with hyper- 
inflation. Moreover, merely to assume that a majority of the public 
might believe that their interests are being served by reducing inflation 
really begs the question. 
We suggest that the concern for inflation reflects the imperatives of 
a corporate capitalist culture and that the consolidation of business cre- 
ates both inflationary pressure and the imperative to hold those infla- 
tionary pressures in check. Moreover, anti-inflation efforts have 
accommodated corporate consolidation and extended corporate hege- 
mony. Why do Americans believe that even moderate inflation is 
harmful? Because, as Paul Peretz has argued, they have been told that 
it is harmful by policymakers, economists, and business leaders who 
largely reflect the interests of the corporate sector." 
A Radical Institutionalist Perspective 
While it is perhaps true that the Marxists have contributed most to 
our understanding of the relationship between the state and the corpo- 
ration, institutionalists have become increasingly interested in exam- 
ining the various aspects of corporate hegemony.14 While Gardiner 
Means and others describe how corporate consolidation contributes to 
inflation, insufficient attention has been paid to the ways in which mac- 
roeconomic policy goals and stabilization policy in the postwar period 
have reflected the imperatives of a corporate culture. 
While empirical studies such as those of Hibbs indicate that inflation 
has tended to erode away after-tax profits, the factors identified as being 
most responsible for this decline in profits have changed significantly 
since 1981. Tax laws concerning depreciation allowances have been 
changed to allow valuation of capital assets at current levels and many 
firms have now switched to inventory valuation methods based upon 
last in/first out (LIFO), thus decreasing corporate tax 1iability.Is Yet, 
corporate aversion to inflation appears unaltered. 
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John Kenneth Galbraith, in The New Industrial State, offers an al- 
ternative explanation for the corporate aversion to inflation. In his 
view, inflation interferes with the planning sector, which requires sta- 
bility in costs and prices for effective planning. As Galbraith sees it, 
"Inflationary price and cost increases, moving unpredictably through 
the system . . . introduce an unwelcome element of randomness and er- 
ror."ln The uncertainty associated with inflation undermines the cor- 
poration's ability to safely engage in long-term contracts. While the 
planning sector may have market power to pass along cost increases, 
changes in prices may also make the management of demand more 
difficult by making consumers more sensitive to changes in prices. 
While the goal of reducing inflation appears to reflect the interest of 
the corporate sector, government policies to reduce inflation have, 
moreover, accommodated the corporate sector and expanded corpo- 
rate hegemony by increasing unemployment, weakening labor, and ac- 
celerating consolidation and concentration. Throughout the postwar 
period, policy-makers have consistently fought inflation through con- 
tractionary aggregate demand policies and consistently denied that it 
would increase unemployment. From Richard Nixon's "gradualism" 
to Ronald Reagan's "supply-side" machinations, we have been prom- 
iseda painless solution to inflation and given a good dose ofunemploy- 
ment and recession. In what ways have these induced recessions 
advanced the interests of the corporate sector? Given that corporate 
profits are highly pro-cyclical. isn't it in the interest of the corporate 
sector to guarantee sustained expansion? 
This is not, of course, a new question. Michal Kalecki, in 1943, ad- 
dressed this question and argued that capitalist systems will continue 
to experience periodic unemployment, not because governments would 
be technically incapable of maintaining full employment, but because 
the government would intentionally create recession and unemploy- 
ment. Kalecki shared Marx's view that the state is an arm ofthe capital- 
ist class and argued that politicians would respond to pressure from 
groups averse to maintaining full employment, those who require peri- 
odic unemployment or the threat of unemployment to "discipline in 
the factories."" Therefore, while periodic unemployment and recession 
reduce corporate profits, they also provide a valuable means of control- 
ling labor. However, our increasing reliance on monetary policy as a 
means of fighting inflation also serves the interest of the corporate sec- 
tor. 
Reflecting upon The New Industrial State, Galbraith suggests that the 
planning system's control over the state has gone beyond what Gal- 
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braith had himself envisioned some twenty years earlier. Moreover, 
Galbraith did not anticipate the "escape into monetarism" with its high 
real interest rates and the degree to which monetary policy would ac- 
commodate the needs of the planning sector. "Like others," Galbraith 
remarked, "while doubting the efficacy of monetary policy, I assumed 
it to be socially and politically neutral. It assuredly is not."18 
Monetary policy has increasingly been the preferred, although not 
sole, policy tool for fighting inflation. When inflation began to increase 
in the mid-1960s, it was contractionary monetary policy that was first 
to respond. The result was the 1966 credit crunch. In 1973 when the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quadrupled 
the price of oil, it was the Federal Reserve's offsetting response of con- 
tractionary policies that helped propel the economy into the worst re- 
cession, at that time, since the Great Depression. Again in 1980, 
monetary policy turned wildly contractionary in response to another 
supply-side shock. Moreover, the 198 1-1 982 recession, now the worst 
since the Great Depression, was also largely the result of severely con- 
tractionary monetary policy. 
Many reasons account for the use of contractionary monetary policy 
to fight inflation. The growth of entitlement programs, defense spend- 
ing, and the increase in the interest component of government outlays 
have made a large portion of the budget untouchable. These hctors, 
along with the reluctance of politicians to raise taxes, may also account 
for the use of monetary policy. But there are other compelling factors 
that suggest why monetary policy has been the weapon of choice in 
fighting inflation. 
As Galbraith has suggested, contractionary monetary policy results 
in high real interest rates, which have been attractive to upper income 
individuals and large corporations. Because nonhancial corporations 
are less dependent upon external sources to finance capital expendi- 
tures, they, along with individuals with money to lend, benefit from 
high real interest rates.19 Both wealthy individuals and corporations 
benefit from high real interest rates on financial assets without suffering , 
losses from borrowing in credit markets. Perhaps more important, 
however, is the impact of high real 'interest rates on corporate concen- 
tration and power. 
In their study of credit markets, E. W. Davis and K. A. Yeomans 
assert that restrictive monetary policy allows larger companies to put 
a "credit squeeze" on their smaller competitors. Examining liquidity 
and net trade credit given during the "ease" and "squeeze" periods, Da- 
vis and Yeomans conclude that small companies suffer liquidity dete- 
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rioration and increase their bank borrowing during the squeeze years. 
Because small firms lack the corporation's ability to finance internally, 
they are far more vulnerable to problems of insufficient credit. The pri- 
mary significance of the squeeze on small companies is that the weak- 
ened position of smaller firms increases the likelihood of concentration 
in that industry.20 
Increasing concentration does more than enhance corporate power; 
it also tends to increase income inequality. In an empirical study an- 
alyzing the relationship between concentration and income distribu- 
tion, Irene Powell finds that a reduction in concentration results in 
a decrease in income inequality.21 When concentration decreases, ex- 
cess profits decline, resulting in falling prices for consumers. Powell ar- 
gues that these falling prices benefit lower-income households while 
reducing income to upper-income households. She concludes that a re- 
duction in concentration is associated with a decrease in income in- 
equality. Although Powell's study examines the impact of decreases in 
concentration on income inequality, the opposite case can easily be 
made that increases in industry concentration would result in an in- 
crease in income inequality. 
The use of contractionary monetary policy increases income in- 
equality indirectly through its impact on industry concentration and 
directly through high interest rates in general. Since the majority of 
interest-bearing assets are held by wealthier individuals, increases in 
real interest rates will raise their relative income. In part because of 
higher real interest rates, the interest component of national income 
has risen to around ten percent.z2 
Concluding Remarks 
In Radical Institutionalism: Contemporary Voices, James Dietz crit- 
ically evaluates the contribution that radical institutionalists might 
make to our understanding of political economy. Dietz argues that a 
useful avenue for exploration concerns the role of the state in a culture 
of corporate capitalism. Moreover, examination of the role of the state 
will most likely entail a class rather than class-less interpretation, where 
"changes that truly benefit classes other than the ruling class" are pos- 
sible while the "thrust of the state's efforts must, and will, be directed 
toward providing an environment in which the capitalist productive 
apparatus is effectively reproduced."23 
Because evidence suggests that inflation hurts upper-income house- 
holds and the corporate sector while, if not benefiting, at least not hurt- 
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ing a majority of the population, the aversion to inflation and the policy 
induced contractions to fight inflation are best viewed within the frame- 
work of class. As Harry G. Johnson has said, "From one important 
point of view, indeed, the avoidance of inflation and the maintenance 
of full employment can be most usefully regarded as conflicting class 
interests."" 
The tension generated by the class struggle over the inflation- 
unemployment trade-off has been mediated, in part, by the state. The 
state, as Marx and Veblen believed, has often, although not always, ac- 
commodated the interests of the corporate class where the corporate 
class is not merely profit-maximizing, but seeks power as well as profits. 
In addition, the state often attempts to mold public opinion to conform 
to the interests of the corporate class. 
The state's role in shaping public opinion on the costs of inflation 
represents an example of what William Dugger has referred to as an 
"enabling myth."Zs The belief that inflation is detrimental to everyone 
not only allows politicians to pursue anti-inflationary policies that ben- 
efit the interests of the corporate class, but compels them to do so. In 
so doing, the inflation myth perpetuates economic and social policies 
that enhance the power and status of corporations, exacerbate income 
inequality, and undermine participatory democracy. 
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